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Importance of untested infectious 
individuals for interventions 
to suppress COVID‑19
Francisco J. Pérez‑Reche1*, Ken J. Forbes2 & Norval J. C. Strachan1
The impact of the extent of testing infectious individuals on suppression of COVID‑19 is illustrated 
from the early stages of outbreaks in Germany, the Hubei province of China, Italy, Spain and the 
UK. The predicted percentage of untested infected individuals depends on the specific outbreak but 
we found that they typically represent 60–80% of all infected individuals during the early stages of 
the outbreaks. We propose that reducing the underlying transmission from untested cases is crucial 
to suppress the virus. This can be achieved through enhanced testing in combination with social 
distancing and other interventions that reduce transmission such as wearing face masks. Once 
transmission from silent carriers is kept under control by these means, the virus could have been fully 
suppressed through fast isolation and contact tracing of tested cases.
Daniel Defoe in “A Journal of the Plague Year” (1722) comments on the 1665 Great Plague of London that “. . . 
if all the infected persons were effectually shut in, no sound person could have been infected by them, because 
they could not have come near them. But the case was this (and I shall only touch it here): namely, that the infec-
tion was propagated insensibly, and by such persons as were not visibly infected, who neither knew whom they 
infected or who they were infected by.”1 COVID-19 is presenting similar problems today.
COVID-19 produced by the SARS-CoV-2 virus probably emerged in Wuhan, China in December  20192 and 
has subsequently spread. By 10 April 2020 there were 1,521,252 confirmed cases and 92,798 deaths distributed 
in 213  countries3. One year later, there were around 135 million confirmed cases and almost 3 million deaths 
from 220  countries4. The worldwide burden of the disease is still very high despite significant efforts in many 
countries to suppress the spread of the virus. Until the end of 2020, when vaccines became available, efforts to 
suppress the virus focused on non-pharmaceutical interventions which ranged from handwashing and social 
distancing to contact tracing and more stringent measures such as isolation of infected individuals, banning of 
large gatherings or strict  lockdowns5–7.
Optimising interventions to mitigate or suppress the burden of COVID-19 during an epidemic is a press-
ing global challenge due to significant uncertainties regarding the transmissibility of SARS-CoV-2 and other 
factors such as potentially large numbers of undocumented infections as well as political, social and economic 
 considerations8,9. Underreported cases may include asymptomatic infected  individuals10–12 and some that pre-
sent symptoms but are not reported or are diagnosed with an alternative  disease13. There is no consensus on the 
proportion of unreported cases and their potential impact on the spread of SARS-CoV-2. For instance, a World 
Health Organization report in February 2020 suggested that “the proportion of truly asymptomatic infections is 
unclear but appears to be relatively rare and does not appear to be a major driver of transmission”14.
Studies testing for SARS-CoV-2 infection in both symptomatic and asymptomatic  individuals10–12, however, 
suggest that reported asymptomatic carriers can represent 50% or more of the cases at the time of testing. These 
may include true asymptomatic that remain asymptomatic throughout their infection and pre-symptomatic 
individuals that become symptomatic after testing. A comprehensive review suggests that around 20% of infected 
individuals are true  asymptomatic15. Most countries test individuals when they have symptoms, and unreported 
infections are likely to include most of the asymptomatic individuals and a fraction of those with symptoms. 
Such asymptomatic individuals can act as silent carriers for SARS-CoV-2 and have been suggested as a key factor 
promoting the rapid spread of the  virus16, similar to what has previously been observed with other infectious 
 diseases17. An important question is to what extent isolation and contact tracing that has been implemented by 
many countries are effective in preventing the spread of SARS-CoV-2 if there is a significant proportion of infec-
tious individuals that are not tested for it. On the positive side, if recovery from infection leads to immunity, one 
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could hope that untested positive individuals could significantly contribute to the build-up of herd immunity in 
the  population18,19. However, population-based sero-epidemiological studies suggest that the levels of population 
immunity reached through natural infection are far from that needed for herd immunity even in countries that 
have experienced the largest  epidemics20.
Overall, the levels of underreporting of cases and the importance of such silent carriers on interventions 
for mitigation and  suppression21 of the virus are not clear. Mathematical modelling has been very successful in 
 epidemiology22–24 to devise and simulate suppression strategies and there is an ongoing effort to describe the 
dynamics of COVID-19 epidemics with mathematical  models5,16,19,21,25–37. The effect of undocumented cases on 
the spread of the virus has been studied  previously16, but the influence of such cases on control strategies has not 
been analysed. Asymptomatic individuals have been included in some  models5,28,30,33,34,37,38 but the role of silent 
carriers in terms of untested cases is not fully understood.
Here we use mathematical models to quantify the levels of underreporting in several COVID-19 outbreaks 
and understand how this influences the spread of the virus and the efficacy of non-pharmaceutical measures 
to suppress it.
Materials and methods
Data. Our analysis uses data on numbers of infected and deceased individuals by country or region obtained 
from the Wolfram Data  Repository39. We focus on the outbreaks in Germany, Hubei (China), Italy, Spain and 
United Kingdom (UK). All these countries have implemented social distance measures to control the spread of 
the virus. These measures involved global interventions that aim for a reduction of transmission at the population 
level (e.g., a lockdown) and local interventions involving isolation of infectious individuals and their contacts 
(see details in Additional file 1). Nationwide lockdowns were ordered in all the studied countries/regions to sup-
press the virus at the beginning of the outbreaks (see Sect. 1 in Additional file 1). These lockdowns were relaxed 
after periods that ranged between 56 days in Spain and around 100 days in the UK. Once the initial nationwide 
lockdowns were relaxed, all study countries kept stay-at-home policies which were particularly strict in China 
(see Sect. 2 in Additional file 1). In addition, all countries increased testing and contact tracing efforts. Among 
the European countries, Germany performed the largest number of tests per thousand people and had the lowest 
positive rate at the early stages of the epidemic (March and April 2020; see Figs. 4.2 and 5.2 in Additional file 1). 
From June 2020, the UK experienced the most prominent increase in testing efforts and registered the lowest 
positive rate (see Figs. 4.1 and 5.1 in Additional file 1). This was associated with the launching of test and trace 
schemes in the four nations of the UK during May 2020 (13 May in  Wales40, 20 May in Northern  Ireland41 and 28 
May in  England42 and  Scotland43). We did not find detailed data on daily tests performed in China but according 
to the COVID-19 Government Response  Tracker44,45, testing and contact tracing have remained at high levels in 
China since the early stages of the epidemic (see Sects. 3.1 and 4 in Additional file 1). In fact, only the measures 
in China were able to avoid a resurgence of the virus so far. The rest of the regions considered here had further 
waves of infection and all of them except Spain ordered further lockdowns at the end of 2020 and/or beginning 
of 2021 (see Sect. 1 in Additional file 1).
Models. To describe the role of silent carriers in the spread of the virus, we used extensions of the SEIR 
 model16,23,25,29 to include two types of infected individuals: tested (or reported) and untested (or unreported). 
The classification of infectious individuals into tested and untested classes intends to be in line with the available 
data which contains the number of tested cases. We remark that such classification does not make an explicit 
distinction between symptomatic and asymptomatic cases; in principle, both tested and untested classes may 
contain symptomatic and asymptomatic cases.
We propose two models: model 1 and model 2. Model 1 is a relatively simple extension of the SEIR model 
that we use to describe the early stages of epidemics in each of the regions. This model is fitted to data to estimate 
key epidemiological parameters and the proportion of tested and untested infectious individuals in each region 
(see parameter estimation methods below). Model 2 is a generalisation of model 1 to account for the isolation 
of infectious individuals and their contacts. The estimated parameters for model 1 are used to parameterise 
model 2. We now introduce both models, describe the main assumptions of the models and the methods for 
parameter estimation.
Model 1. Model 1 assumes that individuals can be in any of five compartments: Susceptible ( S ), exposed to the 
virus ( E ), tested infectious ( It ), untested infectious ( Iu ), recovered tested cases ( Rt ), dead after testing positive 
( D ) and untested infectious that recover or die ( Zu ). The flow between compartments is schematically shown in 
Fig. 1a. The change of the number of individuals in each compartment is described by deterministic, continuous-
time dynamics given by the following differential equations:
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Here, N is the population size (see Table S1 in Additional file 2). According to these equations, susceptible 
individuals (compartment S ) become exposed to the virus (compartment E ) at a rate β(It + Iu)/N . Here, β is 
the rate at which an infected individual transmits the infection to a susceptible individual and (It + Iu)/N is the 
fraction of infectious individuals at time t  . Exposed individuals remain in this state during a latent period ζ−1 










It = ζρtE − γt It ,
Iu = ζ(1− ρt)E − γuIu,
Rt = (1− ρd)γt It ,
Zu = γuIu,
Ḋ = ρdγt It .
Figure 1.  (a) Flow diagram for the compartment of model 1. Panels (b–d) show a typical time evolution of 
model variables. As the epidemic progresses, (b) the number of susceptible individuals decreases. The number 
of exposed individuals initially increases, reaches a peak and decreases at later stages of the epidemic. (c) The 
progression of the number of both tested and untested infected individuals also exhibits a peak. The decay 
of  It and Iu after the peak induces a gradual weakening of the chain of transmission that leads to the end of 
the epidemic. (d) The number of tested and untested individuals that recover from infection or die increase 
monotonically during the epidemic.
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to the tested infected compartment It . The remaining fraction of infectious individuals, 1− ρt , are not tested 
for infection and move to the untested infected compartment, Iu , after the incubation period. A fraction ρd of 
infected individuals that were tested for infection, i.e. a fraction ρd of It , die at a rate γt and move to compart-
ment, D . The rest of the tested cases move to the recovered compartment Rt . The fraction ρd corresponds to the 
case fatality rate (CFR). The infection fatality rate (IFR) is the proportion of the total population that dies and 
can be determined from our models as IFR = ρdρt . Infected individuals in the untested compartment, Iu , move 
to the compartment Zu . Assuming that recovered individuals are fully immune to infection, individuals in the 
compartment Zu are effectively removed from the epidemic. See a typical time evolution of the model variables 
in Fig. 2b-d.
The reproductive number corresponding to this model can be analytically calculated using the next genera-
tion  method24 and conveniently expressed as the sum of two terms, R0 = Rt0 +R
u
0 , giving the contribution of 
tested and untested individuals, respectively. The dependence of these contributions on the parameters of the 
model are given by the following expressions:
Model 2—Isolation and contact tracing. Model 2 is an extension of model 1 to study the effect of isolation of 
infected individuals and their contacts. This is achieved by adding two more compartments to model 1, Qt and 
Qu , which contain isolated tested and untested infectious individuals, respectively (see Fig. 2a). The fraction of 
tested and untested infectious individuals who are isolated are denoted as ρQt and ρQu , respectively. Both types 
of infectious individuals are assumed to become isolated at the same rate, δ . Isolation of tested individuals is the 
most natural isolation strategy. Possible isolation of untested individuals, however, was incorporated to simulate 
scenarios in which some untested individuals may self-isolate without being tested if they exhibit symptoms or 
due to reasons that might not be linked to their infection (e.g. being advised to work from home or voluntarily 
trying to minimise contact). Contact tracing involves isolation of a fraction q of susceptible individuals that were 
in contact with infected tested cases (see Fig. 2b). A fraction b of these contacts would have acquired the virus 
through the contact (i.e. in the absence of contact tracing and isolation, they would have moved to the exposed 
compartment). These individuals are quarantined in the Qt compartment before they become infections and will 
eventually recover or die. The remaining contacts, i.e. a fraction 1− b , remain susceptible after the interaction 
with the infected case and their isolation is represented by a compartment SQ where they remain for a period 
σ−1Q  . After this period, such individuals remain susceptible and return to the S compartment. With these assump-







Figure 2.  Model 2. (a) Extension of the flow diagram of model 1 (see Fig. 1) to incorporate a compartment 
Qt for isolation of tested infectious individuals and a compartment Qu for isolation of untested infectious 
individuals. (b) Flow diagram showing the implementation of contact tracing in model 2.
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Here, k is the number of contacts per unit time. The transmission rate is given by β = kb . Splitting the trans-
mission rate into the number of contacts per unit time, k , and the fraction of successful transmissions in a con-
tact, b , is necessary to model contact  tracing23. Note that model 1 can be formally recovered from model 2 when 
the rates related to isolation and contact tracing are zero, i.e. when  ρQt = ρQu = γQ = q = σQ = 0 in Eq. (3).
One can again use the next generation  method24 to obtain an expression for the reproduction number of 
model 2 which can be expressed as the sum of two terms, RQ = RtQ +R
u
Q , where
Control measures. Both model 1 and model 2 can be used to simulate measures such as a lockdown that achieve 
a reduction of transmission at the population level. This is simply implemented by reducing the intrinsic trans-
mission rate β by a factor r ∈ [0, 1] (i.e. the reduced transmission is β(1− r)).
The effect of the initial lockdown ordered in all studied countries and subsequent relaxation was simulated 
with a piece-wise dependence of β on time (see details in Sect. 1 of Additional file 3). The gradual increase in 
testing efforts, isolation of cases and contact tracing was simulated with model 2 assuming sigmoid growth func-
tions for ρt , ρQt and q (see details in Sect. 1 of Additional file 3).
Main assumptions of the models. Several simplifying assumptions were made to make the models operational 
and applicable to settings with limited data which are typical at early stages of epidemics. Here, we describe the 
main assumptions.
Homogeneous populations. The total number of individuals in each compartment of our models represent 
average values for the whole country. More precise descriptions at smaller scales such as geographical regions 
within countries or at the level of individuals would require accounting for spatial heterogeneity within the 
 populations31,46 (e.g. cities and rural areas) as well as differences in both susceptibility and mortality across 
different age and vulnerability  groups47,48 or topological heterogeneity of the network of contacts between 
 individuals49.
Ignoring heterogeneities limits the ability of our models to identify specific ways to make interventions 
operational. For instance, reductions in transmission are treated at a generic level without specifying if they 
could be achieved by enhanced social distancing, school closure, etc. Accounting for such details would require 
using individual-based  simulations21.
Deterministic dynamics. We focused on stages of epidemics in which the number of infectious individuals is 
large enough as for stochastic effects to be relatively unimportant on  average27. Our models can be extended to 
incorporate  stochasticity50,51. This would give a more accurate description of epidemics when SARS-CoV-2 has 
just invaded or at later stages when the number of infected individuals becomes very low.
All of the population at the start of the epidemic are susceptible. However, it may be that a proportion of the 
population are not susceptible for genetic  reasons52 or due to cross  immunity53,54.
Imported cases. We focused on epidemics that are at a stage in which imported cases are expected to play a 
secondary role relative to internal transmission. Accounting for imported cases is crucial, however, to prevent re-
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be included in our models in terms of an influx of infected individuals. In scenarios in which imported cases 
represent an important fraction of new infections, however, a stochastic version of the model would be more 
appropriate than the deterministic dynamics used here.
The transition times between compartments are exponentially distributed. This memory-less assumption is 
usual for classical compartmental  models23. For COVID-19, however, transitions between compartments are 
better described in terms of gamma  distributions5,47 and using models with memory would provide a more 
precise description of the  dynamics5,23,57.
Tested and untested cases transmit infection at the same rate. The populations of tested and untested cases will 
typically consist of different proportions of symptomatic and asymptomatic cases. In spite of that, no statisti-
cal difference has been observed between the viral load of symptomatic and asymptomatic  individuals58,59. It is 
therefore reasonable to assume that transmission is similar for symptomatic and asymptomatic individuals and 
therefore similar for tested and untested cases. Differences in overall transmission, however, are incorporated in 
the model through the assumption that recovery rates for tested and untested cases can be different.
Immunity follows after recovery from infection. Whether or not this is the case, and even if it is, the duration 
of the immunity is still  unclear60. Our model could easily be extended to account for re-infections, should such 
data become available, and predictions might significantly change.
The latent and incubation periods coincide. We adopted a parsimonious approach which assumes that the 
latent period (i.e. the time between exposure to communicability) coincides with the incubation period (time 
between exposure and the appearance of symptoms)25. There is, however, a growing body of evidence for pre-
symptomatic  transmission61–65. There is the potential to incorporate this in our models by varying the incubation 
rate parameter, ζ , or including a new compartment for pre-symptomatic infectious  individuals31. We expect our 
predictions to be qualitatively independent of these details.
Reported deaths. We assume that the number of deaths in the datasets originates from individuals that were 
tested for infection.
Transmission in different regions. It is assumed that transmission of SARS-CoV-2 and the fraction of infec-
tious cases are similar in different regions. This is reflected in the informative prior distributions used for ρd and 
R0 in the parameter estimation procedure (see Table 1).
Parameter estimation. We fitted the Model 1 to data. The value for the incubation rate was set  to48 ζ = 
1/5.2  days-1. The free parameters in our fits were the rate of transmission, β , proportion of infectious that were 
tested, ρt , proportion of tested infectious that die, ρd , rate to recovery of tested infectious individuals, γt , rate of 
recovery of untested infectious individuals, γu , and initial number of exposed individuals, E(0) . We denote the 
free parameters by a vector θ = {β , ρt , ρd , γt , γu,E(0)}.  The model was fit to the time series for the number of 
daily reported infected individuals and cumulative deaths, Dobs = {iτ , dτ }mτ=1 , in a period of m days in the early 
stages of epidemics (here, τ is used to denote discrete time in days). In particular, we used m = 15 days since the 
first data point with a positive number of deaths (see Table S1  in Additional file 2). We used data at early stage of 
each outbreak to minimise the influence of suppression strategies on our parameter estimates.
Using data on deaths is important to obtain reliable descriptions of COVID-19 epidemics since data on deaths 
is likely to be more accurately recorded than data on infected and recovered  individuals5,19,38,66. In addition to 
deaths, we can use data on infected individuals which is represented by the tested infectious compartment, It , 
in our models.
Our fitting procedure aims at calculating the posterior probability density function for the parameters given 
the data, π(θ |Dobs) . To this end, we use the procedure proposed  in51 which can be regarded as an approximate 
Bayesian  algorithm67. The posterior π(θ |Dobs) is approximated by the empirical distribution of a set of 500 point 
estimates  θ̂  of the model parameters. A point estimate θ̂  is obtained by simulating ne = 3000 epidemics with 




 denotes a 
normal distribution with mean µ and variance σ 2 . U(a, b) denotes a uniform distribution in the interval (a, b).
Parameter Prior Support
Fraction tested infected,ρt U(0, 1) Uninformative for ρt ∈ [0, 1]




Mean set to the global estimate of  WHO85
Recovery rate for untested infected,γt U(0, 0.4)
Range assumed from manual fit exploration (contains typical values for recovery 
 rate25,47)






Transmission rate,β Derived from other parameters using Eq. (2)




Refs.16,25 and manual fit exploration
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parameters sampled from a prior probability density π̂(θ) . In each realization, a simulation of Model 1 produces 
deterministic evolution functions  It(t) and D(t) for the number of tested cases and cumulative deaths. The 







 , where 
isimτ  and dsimτ  are, respectively, the number of tested infected and deaths predicted at day τ . The point estimate θ̂  
is defined as the parameter vector corresponding to the realization that gives the closest prediction,Dsim , to the 
observations, Dobs . More explicitly, the point estimate for the model parameters is given by
where ρ(Dobs|Dsim(θ)) is a distance function. In particular, we used a weighted quadratic form for the distance:
Weighting by the observed values was used to account for the fact that the values taken by iτ and dτ differ by 
orders of magnitude. We checked, however, that fits with an unweighted distance give results that are statistically 
compatible with those reported in the main text. In addition, in the previous version of this work we obtained 
similar results by an approximate maximisation of a log-likelihood function in which isimτ (θ) ∼ Pois(It(τ )) and 
dsimτ (θ) ∼ Pois(D(τ )) , i.e. the predicted number of tested infected and deaths were described as random variables 
obeying a Poisson distribution with mean It(τ ) and D(τ ) ,  respectively68.
The prior probability density is defined as the product of priors for each parameter:
The priors used in our fits are summarised in Table 1.
Results
Calibration of Model 1 at early stages of epidemics. Figure 3 shows the estimates for the parameters 
of model 1 applied to the early stages of each outbreak (see numerical summary statistics in Additional file 2, 
Table S2). A comparison of the predicted trends and the data is shown in Additional file 2, Fig. S1.
The values for the testing coverage, ρt , reveal that during the early stage of outbreaks, Germany scored the 
highest in terms of testing for infection (34% [95% CI 10–96%]). Hubei follows Germany in terms of testing 
coverage, followed by Spain, Italy and the UK. Our prediction for Hubei (32% [95% CI 11–85%]) is statistically 
consistent with the 65% reporting estimated by Li et al.16 for China (not only Hubei) in the period 24 Jan–8 Feb 
2020 which overlaps with the period 22 Jan–6 Feb 2020 used here. We note, however, that our estimate has a 
wide 95% CI and the comparison is not highly informative. The high testing percentage predicted for Germany 
agrees with the higher testing coverage at early stages of epidemics in this country (see Fig. 4.2 in Additional 
file 1). Taking the confidence intervals into account, we estimate that for each infected individual tested in the UK, 
there could have been between 1 and 9 untested infected individuals. At the other end of the testing spectrum, 
we estimate that for each infected individual tested in Germany, between 0.05 and 9 individuals might have not 
been tested at the beginning of the epidemic. A higher testing coverage for Germany is in qualitative agreement 










































































































































































Figure 3.  Boxplot statistics of the estimated parameters for model 1.
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those obtained by Jagodnik et al.38 and the differences we found between countries are not as extreme as those 
given by Chicchi et al.28.
From our estimates of ρt , we predict that 66% [95% CI 4–90%] of infected individuals were not tested for 
infection in Germany. Bearing in mind that 50% of infected individuals might be reported as asymptomatic at 
 testing10,12, we conclude that untested cases in Germany would mostly correspond to asymptomatic cases at test-
ing. In contrast, untested cases in other countries might include a significant number of symptomatic individuals 
in addition to asymptomatic cases. In particular, these may include infections of care home residents that are 
known to be underreported in many countries at early stages of  epidemics69.
The proportion of tested infected individuals that die, ρd , is smaller for the outbreak in Germany than for 
the other outbreaks. This might be a combined effect of the fact that infected individuals in this country were 
relatively young at the beginning of the  outbreak70 and the high testing rate. Indeed, the COVID-19 fatality rate is 
lower for the younger than for the  elderly47 and, the higher the testing rate, the more individuals with mild or no 
symptoms will be included in the tested infected compartment of our model. The lower death rate of individuals 
with mild symptoms will lead to an effectively lower death rate for the whole set of infected individuals in this 
compartment. Accordingly, a lower value of ρd does not necessarily mean a lower overall infection fatality rate. 
In fact, our estimates for IFR = ρtρd does not vary much among countries (between 0.5% [95% CI 0.1–1.1%] 
for Germany and 1.1% [95% CI 0.4–2.9%] for Hubei). These values are compatible with an IFR of 0.68% [95% 
CI 0.53–0.82%] reported for several studies in a systematic  review71. Related to this, we found that the predicted 
fraction of deaths by the end of unmitigated epidemics is not too different for different countries either: 0.2% 
[95% CI 0.03–0.8%] for Germany, 0.8% [95% CI 0.3–3.6%] for Hubei, 0.7% [95% CI 0.3–2.1%] for Italy, 0.8% 
[95% CI 0.3–3.6%] for Spain and 0.6% [95% CI 0.2–2.3%] for the UK.
Our estimates for the time γ−1t  from reporting of infection to recovery or death are 3.4 [95% CI 2.4–6.0] 
days for Spain, 3.7 [95% CI 2.6–6.3] days for Italy, 3.7 [95% CI 2.6–6.5] days for UK, 4.4 [95% CI 2.7–7.1] days 
for Hubei and 10 [95% CI 3–26] days for Germany. The time for Hubei is consistent with estimates for China in 
other  studies16,35. In general, the values we obtained are smaller than the infectious period (time from infection 
to death or recovery) reported elsewhere for COVID-195,47,72. Our estimates thus probably reflect a reporting 
delay in all the studied outbreaks, in agreement with data on the onset of symptoms and  reporting70,73,74. Under 
this hypothesis, our model predicts the smallest reporting delay for Germany, in agreement with a higher testing 
effort in this country at early stages of the epidemic.
The removal period for untested infected individuals, γ−1u  , ranges between 3.1 [95% CI 2.5–6.1] days for Hubei 
and 3.5 [95% CI 2.5–8.0] days for the UK. Comparing with the reporting-to-recovery period γ−1t  and bearing in 
mind the reporting delays in all outbreaks, our estimates of γ−1u  suggest that untested individuals remain infec-
tious for a shorter time than tested individuals.
We predict that the number of exposed individuals at the beginning of our simulations, E(0) , is of the order 
of several thousand for all the countries, in qualitative agreement with estimates of a previous study for  China16.
The estimated reproduction number R0 is statistically similar in all the studied outbreaks. This reflects our 
prior assumption that transmission of SARS-CoV-2 is intrinsically similar in different regions. The transmission 
rate, β , was derived from the estimates of ρt , γt , γu and R0 and it takes values that are around 1 for all countries.
Suppression strategies. Suppression of the virus is achieved when the reproductive number is smaller 
than 1. In terms of model 2, the condition RQ < 1 can be achieved in several different ways, i.e. there are many 
combinations of the parameters of the model that can lead to suppression of the virus (see Eq. 4). A simple sup-
pression strategy consists in reducing the transmission rate β . We studied this strategy in April 2020 to make 
predictions related to the lockdowns that were active in Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK; the lockdown had just 
being lifted in  Hubei68. We predicted that early reduction of transmission would delay the outbreaks but resur-
gence of infection was likely after relaxing the lockdowns unless transmission was kept reduced by a factor larger 
than 70% of its intrinsic values (see an update to these results in Sect. 2 of the Additional file 3). These results 
were prescient for Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK where further waves of infection occurred later in 2020.
In addition to nationwide lockdowns, all studied regions have implemented isolation and contact tracing 
programmes to suppress the virus. Following this, the reductions of β mentioned above for scenarios without iso-
lation and contact tracing should be interpreted as an effective measure of the reduction of transmission. Indeed, 
when isolation and contact tracing are taken into account, one needs a smaller reduction in β to suppress the 
virus. Below we use model 2 to account for the combined effect of a reduced β and enhanced testing, isolation and 
contact tracing in the design of suppression strategies bearing in mind the presence of silent carriers of the virus.
From Eq. (4) one can see that interventions that only isolate tested cases and their contacts can reduce the 
reproductive number RtQ associated with tested infected individuals. However, such strategy cannot suppress the 
virus since the reproductive number of untested cases is RuQ > 1 for all the studied epidemics (Fig. 3h). Ensuring 
that RuQ < 1 is then a crucial step for suppression of the virus. The reproduction number R
u
Q decreases with the 
testing rate, physical distancing and isolation of untested cases. Even in optimistic scenarios in which all tested 
cases would isolate in 0.5 days, we estimate that more than 25% of untested cases should isolate to suppress the 
virus. This is unlikely to occur by spontaneous isolation of untested cases (see Sect. 3 of the Additional file 3).
We now focus on more feasible suppression approaches that combine enhanced testing and physical distanc-
ing with isolation and contact tracing of tested cases (i.e. no isolation is assumed for untested infectious indi-
viduals). The condition RuQ < 1 can be achieved through physical distancing and/or enhanced testing that are 
described by a reduction in β and an increase in ρt , respectively. Figure 4a shows the threshold line corresponding 
to RuQ = 1 in the space (ρt , r) , where r is the reduction factor of β . In particular, R
u
Q < 1 can be achieved with-
out the need of physical distancing ( r = 0 ) if more than ~ 80% of infected individuals are tested. The condition 
R
u
Q < 1 could also be achieved without any testing (i.e. with ρt = 0 ) if a severe reduction of transmission with 
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r ∼ 80% is imposed. The later corresponds to a lockdown scenario studied above. Between these two extremes, 
the condition RuQ < 1 requires a combination of physical distancing and enhanced testing.
Once the condition RuQ < 1 is satisfied for untested cases, suppression can be achieved by reducing R
t
Q 
through isolation and contact tracing of tested cases. To illustrate this, we take the UK as an example and consider 
three scenarios with different levels of testing and social distancing.
Testing 30% of cases and reducing transmission by 70% through physical distancing leads to RuQ < 1 (circle 
in Fig. 4a) and suppression is possible if ∼ 20% of infected cases were isolated in δ−1 = 0.5 days (see black line in 
Fig. 4b). In this case, contact tracing would not be needed. For slower isolation of tested cases, however, contact 
tracing would be needed even if 100% of tested cases were isolated. This is illustrated in Fig. 4b by the lines cor-
responding to isolation in δ−1 = 2 or 3 days. Our results echo other studies in terms of the need to quickly isolate 
infected  individuals75. In order to allow for a reasonable time between reporting of infection and isolation, car-
riers of the virus should be identified as early as possible, i.e. reporting delays should be minimised.
Suppression is also possible if 50% of cases are tested and strong physical distancing is imposed which keeps 
transmission reduced by a 60% (square in Fig. 4a). In this case, suppression without contact tracing is only pos-
sible for prompt isolation of tested cases (see black line in Fig. 4c). For slower isolation rates, a high coverage of 
Figure 4.  Suppression of the virus with physicals distance, enhanced testing, isolation and contact tracing. 
(a) Threshold lines for the reproduction number of untested cases as a function of the testing percentage ρt 
and reduction of transmission, r . For a given country, RQ < 1 above the line and RQ > 1 below the line. 
The threshold lines for Italy and Hubei, Spain and UK are close to each other and hardly distinguishable in 
the plot. Taking the UK as an example, panels (b–d) show the threshold lines for suppression in terms of the 
isolation and contact tracing percentages of tested cases for different combinations of the testing percentage and 
reduction of transmission marked by the circle, square and triangle in panel (a). More explicitly, the parameters 
are (ρt , r) = (30%, 70%) in panel (b), (ρt , r) = (50%, 60%) in panel (c), and (ρt , r) = (80%, 0%) in panel (d). For 
a given panel, different lines indicate the threshold for different values of the time to isolation, δ−1 , as marked 




= (84%, 60%) and (
ρQt , q
)
= (84%, 95%) , respectively, which were used to simulate the effect of enhanced isolation and contact 
tracing on the daily deaths in the UK (see Sect. 4 in Additional file 3). All lines show estimates based on the 
median of the model parameters.
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contacts is needed even if all tested cases were isolated. For instance, if 100% of tested cases were isolated after 
2 days, more than 60% of contacts should be traced to suppress the virus (see the red line in Fig. 4c).
In principle, mass testing and high compliance with isolation would make suppression possible without 
the need for physical distancing. For instance, suppression would be possible if > 80% of the cases were tested 
(triangle in Fig. 4a). As in the scenarios described above, high isolation and contact tracing would be needed to 
suppress the virus even if isolation is very fast (see Fig. 4d).
Detecting 80% of cases as assumed in the last scenario could be possible if, for instance, only truly asympto-
matic cases escaped testing (around 20% of infected individuals are expected to be truly  asymptomatic15). We 
tested the feasibility of this scenario for the second wave of infection observed in the UK after the relaxation of the 
initial lockdown. Stay-at-home and physical distancing policies remained active once the lockdown was relaxed 
in the UK. It is interesting, however, that the second wave of infection can be explained by model 2 in terms of 
a hypothetical scenario consisting of complete relaxation of the lockdown combined with enhanced testing and 
launching of test and trace schemes throughout the country. More explicitly, the scenario is as follows: Testing 
only misses asymptomatic cases (i.e.15 ρt = 80%), 84% of those that tested positive self-isolate76 after 2 days of 
being  tested77 and 60% of contacts are traced and  isolated78 (this corresponds to the diamond in Fig. 4d that is 
below the red line, i.e. it is in the region with RQ > 1 ). Full details of this analysis and a comparison of the pre-
dictions of model 2 with data are given in Sect. 4 of the Additional file 3. We checked that a similar scenario in 
which 95% of contacts are traced instead of 60% leads to suppression of the virus (see the star symbol in Fig. 4d 
which is above the red line where RQ < 1).
Even though a scenario that assumes a complete relaxation of the lockdown can reproduce the data in the UK, 
a scenario with a partial relaxation of the lockdown is more realistic since stay-at-home and physical distanc-
ing policies remained active after the relaxation of the lockdown. This would indicate that the levels of testing, 
isolation and contact tracing were probably less effective than those used above for complete relaxation of the 
lockdown. For example, we checked that a scenario with post-lockdown transmission reduced by 20% and an 
isolation rate of 20% also captures the observed trend for the number of dealy deaths after the lockdown (see 
Fig. S4(c) in Sect. 4 of the Additional file 3). In general, there can be many combinations of the parameters of 
model 2 leading to a reasonable description of the data. In spite of that, our results suggest that high levels of 
testing, isolation and contact tracing could suppress the virus even if 20% of cases were asymptomatic and not 
tested for infection.
Conclusions
The main aim of our modelling work is to contribute to the understanding of the epidemiological patterns of 
SARS-Cov-2. The models should be viewed as a general guide of how the outbreak and interventions may play 
out rather than as an exact representation of COVID-19 epidemics. In spite of our simplifying assumptions, there 
are two main implications from the models which are relevant for health policy in dealing with the outbreak.
The first, involves the existence of a significant proportion of cases that are not tested and act as silent carri-
ers of the infection. We found that the predicted percentage of untested infected individuals at the early stages 
of epidemics may have represented 60–80% of the cases. The specific percentage depends on the country and 
we found the lowest proportion of unreported cases in Germany. The levels of underreporting are expected to 
have gradually decreased during the course of the studied epidemics since testing capacity increased in all the 
studied regions. It is likely, however, that underreporting remains significant due to asymptomatic individuals 
or cases with mild symptoms.
Our model predicts that a resurgence of the virus was likely after relaxing the initial lockdown in 2020 
in all the studied regions. This would be similar to second waves of infection observed in the 1918 influenza 
 epidemics79. In fact, we made this prediction in April 2020 when lockdowns were still active in the studied 
European countries and it had just been relaxed in  Hubei68. This prediction was confirmed by the resurgence of 
cases observed in European countries in August  202080.
The second implication involves the finding that unreported cases play an important role in the control of 
COVID-19 epidemics. In particular, unreported cases act as silent carriers and control strategies need to account 
for them or be prone to the risk of re-emergence or ineffective suppression of spread. For instance, we predict that 
isolation and contact tracing of tested cases can have a limited impact on the suppression of spread unless the 
underlying transmission of silent carriers is suppressed. The latter can be achieved by combining physical distanc-
ing and thorough testing of case contacts. Related to this, we found that physical distance might not be essential 
in an ideal scenario in which testing only misses 20% of cases (e.g. asymptomatic), there is a high adherence 
to self-isolation policies and contact tracing is highly effective. In the absence of pharmaceutical interventions, 
however, a certain level of physical distance is likely to be necessary for suppression. To summarise, in line with 
previous  work19,81 and our predictions in April 2020, we suggest that widespread testing combined with contact 
 tracing26,27, isolation of infected individuals and social distancing are necessary to suppress SARS-CoV-2 using 
non-pharmaceutical interventions without severe lockdowns.
Vaccinations are now available and our models could be extended to study the combined effect of vaccination 
and non-pharmaceutical interventions on epidemics while accounting for underreporting. Information on the 
effects of vaccines is still limited but it is expected that they will reduce the risk of individuals becoming infected 
and will protect against COVID-19 symptoms and severe  illness82–84. Gradual reductions of the risk of infection 
and risk of death can be readily simulated by assuming gradually decreasing the transmission rate ( β ) and pro-
portion of infected individuals that die ( ρd ). A reduction in β leads to a reduction of the reproduction number 
of both tested and untested infectious individuals and this aids suppression of the virus. Enhanced protection 
against symptoms plays a less clear role in the suppression and would require a more detailed analysis. Indeed, 
protection against symptoms might lead to an increased proportion of silent carriers of the virus. This might 
11
Vol.:(0123456789)
Scientific Reports |        (2021) 11:20728  | https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-021-00056-5
www.nature.com/scientificreports/
lead to an increase in the reproduction number that might ultimately reduce some of the benefits of the vaccine. 
Based on early evidence that vaccines reduce the risk of serious  illness82, prioritising the vaccination of the most 
vulnerable individuals is crucial to make sure that a potential resurge of transmission associated with silent 
carriers occurs when those individuals have been already vaccinated. In addition to that, keeping high levels of 
testing and isolation of cases will be crucial to prevent potential negative effects associated with unreported cases.
Data availability
All data used in this work are available from the cited sources. The models were analysed implemented in Math-
ematica. A notebook that retrieves the data and runs the calculations can be downloaded from https:// doi. org/ 
10. 6084/ m9. figsh are. 14636 199. Point estimates of the parameters of model 1 and an R script to generate Fig. 3 
can also be downloaded from this link.
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